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As we write, the world is still in the grips of aﬁnancial crisis. Germany was one of the ﬁrstcountries to bail out a bank in July 2007. Then,in September 2007, the United Kingdom (UK)witnessed a run on a building society, North-
ern Rock, and the subsequent widespread nationalization of
its banking sector. In the United States, the crisis led to
a number of collapses among ﬁnancial institutions, most
famously Bear Stearns and LehmanBrothers, and the bail out
of the insurance group, AIG, all in 2008.
The causes of the ﬁnancial crisis continue to be debated
(USSenate 2011). Some fault private organizations (i.e., banks),
others blame public organizations (i.e., regulators and public
policies) and/or point to capitalist societies’ preoccupationwith
homeownership. Others have focused on the way in which
diﬀerent “varieties of capitalism” have reacted diﬀerently to
the crisis (Blyth forthcoming, Hall and Soskice 2001).
Now, governments are responding to the ongoing global
ﬁnancial crisis with various regulatory reforms. Changes in
the international (Basel III), European, and national regula-
tory frameworks are being implemented to address diagnosed
weaknesses. In Germany, no major institutional rearrange-
ments occurred asmany feared that such reformmight threaten
the Bundesbank’s independence. In the UK, regulatory reform
moves toward a “twin peak” model of regulation that places
key responsibility on the Prudential Regulation Authority,
established within the Bank of England, and the Financial
Conduct Authority, responsible for ﬁnancial businesses’ con-
duct vis-à-vis customers. In the United States, the Dodd-
FrankWall StreetReformandConsumerProtectionAct passed
in July 2010 set up a “Financial Stability Oversight Council”
consisting of various regulatory bodies and chaired by theTrea-
sury Secretary, as a “resolution authority” to liquidate failing
institutions; placed limitations on proprietary trading (the
“Volcker Rule”); and created a “Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau, an independent unit located within the Federal
Reserve. Both the UK and the United States therefore moved
toward strengthening the institutional role of their central
banks within ﬁnancial regulation.
The ongoing crisis and implementation of reforms have
been accompanied by an interpretive cacophony thatmakes it
diﬃcult to understand what happened, who is responsible,
and how such a crisis might be avoided in the future. This
article clariﬁes the debate on the causes and proposed solu-
tions to the ﬁnancial crisis in Germany, the UK, and United
States.The article uses cultural theory (CT) developed byMary
Douglas, AaronWildavksy, and others (Douglas 1992;Thomp-
son, Ellis, andWildavsky 1990) to classify, chart, and compare
argumentation patterns reﬂected in newspaper reporting on
the crisis to assess several hypotheses. One of these hypoth-
eses is about the trajectory of ﬁnancial reform, another hypoth-
esis is central to comparative political economy studies, and
ﬁnally, three additional hypotheses, although taken from CT
itself, are central to comparative studies of politics and polit-
ical change more generally.
First, with respect to the trajectory of ﬁnancial reform, var-
ious scholars (e.g., Hacker and Pierson 2010, Chapter 10;
Streeck 2010) suggest that the strength of business interests
and the dependency of politics on ﬁnancial interests inWest-
ern democracies is likely to lead to a return to advocacy of
“light touch” regulation in the ﬁnancial sector. The following
analysis indicates that this is not the case, at least in terms of
public argumentation: calls for “more” regulation outweigh
those demanding “less” regulation or advocating caution in
imposing additional regulation.
Second, this article investigates whether distinct national
regulatory styles are noticeable, or whether regulatory propos-
als for the ﬁnancial sector display some similarity, or even
convergence over time, in type of reforms proposed.The “vari-
eties of capitalism” literature has noted howdiﬀerenceswithin
the organization of the economy as well as in the linkages
between state and economy have distinct impacts on the way
economies develop (Hall and Soskice 2001). As “discursive
institutionalists” would argue (Schmidt 2010), these rela-
tional diﬀerences also have distinct impacts on the way risks
are perceived and how economic ideas (or “paradigms”) are
considered. Studies in regulation have similarly considered
the importance of “national” logics (Kagan 2007, Swedlowet al.
2009, Vogel 2003, Wiener 2003). Germany, the UK, and the
United States are usually considered to be diﬀerent in these
ways, yet the analysis of the observed patterns across the three
societies indicates that the same kind of reform arguments
are dominant in all of them.
Third, the research assesses three hypotheses derived from
CT (Douglas 1992;Thompson, Ellis, andWildavsky 1990). One
hypothesis is that the deﬁnition of problems and solutions in
any political area will reﬂect the inﬂuence of no more than
four types of culture (see, e.g., Swedlow 2011a, this issue). A
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second hypothesis, common to some variants of CT, is that all
four types will necessarily be present (see, e.g., Verweij, Luan,
and Nowacki 2011, this issue). Both of these hypotheses are
validated for all three countries. With respect to change, CT
hypothesizes that crises are predicated on cultural surprises:
crises arisewhen a culturalway of conducting political or social
life exhibits failures or severe shortcomings (see, e.g., Swed-
low 2011a, 2011b, this issue). Again, as hypothesized, the three
jurisdictions exhibit an ongoing andheightened degree of con-
testation between worldviews that use the crises to gain
reforms that reﬂect their typical deﬁnition of problems and
solutions. Currently, it appears that those who blame private
actors and demand increased regulation are winning the
debate.
Through a lens informed by CT, studying argumentation
allows us to investigate the extent and direction of public
attention. In brief, CT derives four cultural types from two
dimensions of social relations, group and grid, which are in
continuous contention with each other. The dimension of
group measures the extent to which individuals are incorpo-
rated into a group or collective; grid measures the extent to
which political and social prescriptions constrain individu-
als. The two dimensions produce four cultural types: hierarchs
(high group/high grid), individualists ( low group/low grid),
egalitarians (high group, low grid), and fatalists ( low group/
high grid). Each of these cultural types, or worldviews, is
characterized by diﬀerent interpretations about the state of
the world and underlying cause-eﬀect relationships. This
diﬀerence leads to contrasting understandings of policy prob-
lems and advocacy of competing policy solutions. Self-
interest is embedded in particular worldviews (Wildavsky
1987), and any institutional settlement needs to be under-
stood as a (temporary) expression of dominance of a single
(or coalition of ) dominant worldview(s). Therefore, if policy
making is regarded as a process involving pork barreling,
rent seeking, or other kinds of strategic maneuvering, actors
still need to legitimize their position and win their case
through appeals in the media (Hood and Jackson 1991). Argu-
mentation about ﬁnancial regulation, therefore, provides one
indicator about the trajectory of contestation concerning how
markets should be controlled. Indeed, how markets are regu-
lated is fundamentally about views regarding the autonomy
of the individual, the benevolence (or otherwise) of state inter-
vention, and the belief in the “invisible hand” of the markets.
Table 1 summarizes a CT-driven classiﬁcation of diﬀerent
argumentation patterns (also Hindmoor 2010). In brief, hier-
archical arguments suggest that the appropriate response to
the ﬁnancial crisis is to move “high grid” and “high group,”
emphasizing the importance of prescriptive mandatory rules
and the strengthening of regulatory professionalism. Individ-
ualist claims argue that the ﬁnancial crisis is a result of reg-
ulation and government interventionism, suggesting that “real
markets” will reduce perverse incentives and thereby improve
stability. Egalitarian arguments emphazise that the ﬁnancial
crisis is inherently about the limits of authority and markets.
These arguments stress the need to counter private self-
interest and information asymmetries through providing
tighter consumer-facing transparency and increasing empha-
sis on making regulation “accountable” through people rather
than rules. Finally, fatalists argue that capitalism is inevita-
bly about boom and bust and unexpected events. Therefore,
any attempt at “securing the future” is doomed, in the sense
of any activity triggering inevitable unintended conse-
quences. Alternative fatalist arguments advocate a “lottery-
type” approach of regulation that is based on “contrived
randomness” (Hood 1998), according to this view, as any other
strategy is likely to invite gaming.
METHODOLOGY
The analysis of argumentation involved the extraction of
claims that demanded particular types of regulatory action,
and coding these claims according to their cultural bias (see
Lodge 2011; Lodge, Wegrich, and McElroy 2010), a form of
“cultural auditing” (Swedlow 2002). Information was entered
into a database that includes claims (“the regulator lacks
enforcement powers”), the actor making the claim (“Joe
Bloggs”), date, and media source (thereby broadly reﬂecting
other media analysis exercises; e.g., Chong and Druckman
2007). This strategy allows for a comparison of individual
and organizational arguments and a comparison across news
sources. British and American newspaper stories were taken
fromNexis news, using the search words regulation and ﬁnan-
cial crisis (or, in German, Finanzkrise and Aufsicht). The anal-
ysis includes highly respected newspapers, theNewYorkTimes,
Table 1
Four CulturalWorldviews and Their Responses to the Financial Crisis
FATALISM HIERARCHY
Problem: market economy is a continuous, unpredictable cycle of
boom and bust
Problem: financial crisis as a symptom of lack of order
Solution: impossible to anticipate next crisis, rely in unpredictability,
any other response futile or perverse
Solution: create stronger rules and regulatory bodies
INDIVIDUALISM EGALITARIANISM
Problem: financial crisis as a product of poor incentives and moral
hazard generated by governments
Problem: financial crisis as a symptomof excessive individualismand
failed exercise of authority
Solution: reduce regulatory intervention to minimize ‘government
failure’
Solution: increase transparency, higher professionalism and limits
on discretionary authority and markets
...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
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theWashingtonPost,TheGuardian, andTheTimes; future anal-
ysiswill include theWall Street Journal and theFinancialTimes.
Neither of the two most respected German newspapers
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) and Süddeutsche Zei-
tung) are on Nexis. Only the FAZ facilitated aﬀordable access.
In general, given the prominent standing of these news-
papers, it can be conﬁdently expected that all major sides of
the argument are present. In terms of articles, the US search
generated 1,925 claims (extracted from 1,871 stories); the UK
search, 714 claims (extracted from 917 stories); and German
search, 319 claims (extracted from 435 stories).
Manual coding was used because mechanical extraction
seemed problematic given that CT is not about keywords, but
rather about identifying justiﬁcations. Extraction and coding
followed a double-blind sampling method to check on inter-
coder reliability (0.75). The coding frame emerged in an inter-
active pattern that followed earlier attempts at classifying
regulatory approaches within the CT framework (Hood 1998;
Lodge 2011; Lodge et al. 2010) and the speciﬁcs of the ﬁnan-
cial crisis. As indicated in table 1, claims were coded according
to their implied grid/group characteristics.The following anal-
ysis concentrates on aggregate “pure type” claims rather than
on hybrids or actor-speciﬁc patterns.Table 2 provides an over-
view of claims and how they were allocated to particular cul-
tural worldviews. The remainder of the article presents the
aggregate picture of argumentation patterns over the course
of the ﬁnancial crisis from late 2006 to 15 March 2011. It con-
centrates on “national” claims by domestic actors.
FINDINGS
Figures 1–3 provide a graphic
overview of the argumentation
patterns across the three coun-
tries. This section brieﬂy con-
siders each national pattern
before exploring comparative
insights.
An election-induced overall
decline in argumentation is evi-
dent in the German case, as
political debate moved to more
tractable issues, such as tax
rates, health policy, and labour
market reforms. A delayed rise
in hierarchical arguments is
noticeable as the ﬁnancial
crisis primarily involved pub-
licly owned Landesbanken. The
then opposition FDP (Liber-
als) made largely individualist-
type arguments regarding their
control. Individualist claims
vanish post-September 2009.
This trend can be linked to the
FDP’s entry into government
where they were not allocated
the ﬁnance portfolio. The spike
in interest in late 2010 is largely
about debates whether or not
the Bundesbank should be responsible for ﬁnancial regula-
tion, or whether such a role would undermine its autonomy.
These debates, however, concentrated on the role of the
central bank in regulation and the potential for political
interference rather than on the relationship between state
and market. Therefore, they cannot be interpreted as a
back-to-business-as-usual pattern. The overall decline in
attention and argumentation toward the end of the period is
due to the decision not to seek any regulatory institutional
change.
Table 2
CT Coding Frame Regarding the Financial Crisis
FATALISM HIERARCHY
Crisis always happens in capitalism Capture and corruption are the problem
Groupthink among professions is inevitable Need for prudential regulator
Nobody has any idea what is going on Need for merged regulatory regime
Rules are not going to have any effect Need for mandatory intervention, clear rules & roles
Proposals will have perverse effect Split banks
Regulation will always be undermined Need for international solution
Bring in whistleblowers Impose capital requirements, living wills
Regulators will always be behind markets Expand scope of regulation
Regulation grows without a plan and has no Strengthen existing institutions
positive effects Give central bank dominant role
INDIVIDUALISM EGALITARIANISM
Regulators/government was the cause of crisis Reliance on markets caused melt-down
Perverse rules caused crisis—abolish them Private organisations didn’t know what they were
doingToo many regulators
Banks refuse to clean up their actRegulation is bad for investment/recovery
Change ownership structure of banksMarkets are superior to rules
Limit bonuses and compensation overallBanks/private organisations know best
Encourage information sharingRegulators are acting outside their jurisdiction
People, not rules matterSelf-regulation is superior
Need to act, otherwise impending perilConsumer protection is bad
Mediation and ‘all in one room’ is best way to
regulate
Figure 1
Claim Distribution: Germany
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The UK pattern points to a rise in attention in the fourth
quarter of 2007 that coincides with the collapse of Northern
Rock, the building society. What is also noticeable is an
increase in overall contestation of the demand for more con-
trol (as expressed in the dominance of hierarchical-type claims
throughout the period). Opposition to tougher control (as
expressed through individualist and fatalist claims) gained
increased prominence, especially in the wake of government
proposals for increased regulation (as evident in the delayed
spike towards late 2010). The decline in argumentation in
late 2009 and early 2010 is due to the UK election in early
2010 when ﬁnancial regulation was not a campaign theme:
the overall state of public ﬁnances, the future of public ser-
vices, and social and labour policies took priority. As legisla-
tion was being considered after the 2010 election, a marked
growth occurred in opposition to regulatory reform; how-
ever, this increase merely establishes a renewed diversiﬁca-
tion of argumentation, not a return to previously dominant
views of an individualist “light touch” kind. Indeed, “more”
regulation type views of a hierarchical and egalitarian type
continue to outweigh those of an individualist or fatalist kind.
The US patterns point to a growing dominance of hierar-
chical claims over time, although this dominance only asserts
itself after Barack Obama’s election as president. It declines
after the passing of the Dodd-Frank Act (which explains the
peak in mid-2010). The continued Republican opposition is
evident in the ongoing prominence of individualist and fatal-
ist argumentation patterns. If we assume that fatalist and indi-
vidualist claims represent concerted opposition to ‘hierarchical’
regulatory change, then the opposition to regulatory change
remains at a lower level (with the exception of the fourth quar-
ter of 2010) than the proregulatory change coalition that one
expects to exist between proponents of egalitarian-type and
hierarchical-type arguments.
As noted, the analysis focuses on aggregates rather than
subclaims and/or individual participants in the debate. Nev-
ertheless, the claim distribution provides insights into the
extent and direction of argumentation regarding ﬁnancial
regulation, and it allows for the assessment of the hypoth-
eses considered at the outset. The continued state of height-
ened contestation in argumentation does not conﬁrm a return
to a world dominated by mostly individualist arguments that
would indicate light touch business-friendly regulatory advo-
cacy. Instead, the continued dominance of hierarchical claims
over other claims—and of hierarchical and egalitarian claims
over individualist-fatalist claims—further suggests a contin-
ued dominance of those who argue in favor of more regula-
tion over those who argue for less regulation. In terms of
distinct national styles, no real diﬀerences exist. Hierarchy
predominates across all three societies, with Germany being
somewhat more individualist (which can be accounted for by
the status of Landesbanken as public entities). The analysis
also validates several CT hypotheses, namely that the four
worldviews are able to cover key claims, that they are all
present, and that they are in a state of continued contesta-
tion over the causes and potential solutions to the future of
ﬁnancial regulation. The ﬁnancial crisis most certainly repre-
sents a “surprise” to established assumptions regarding reg-
ulation and ﬁnancial markets. This surprise element is evident
in the rise of argumentation, and its diversiﬁcation over
time, across the three countries. However, how this surprise
of ﬁnancial meltdown is understood and what to do about it
remains a matter of contestation between the diﬀerent world-
views. Although the ﬁnancial crisis has not led to the marked
decline or disappearance of any particular worldview, it is
apparent that hierarchical arguments in favor of more regu-
lation are more prevalent than arguments opposing more
regulation.
CONCLUSION
This article showed how CT can be used to audit argumenta-
tion patterns in the media. Studies in other domains have
pointed to similar patterns (Lodge 2011), while the attempt to
code arguments regarding regulation to advance the agenda
regarding doctrinal argumentation set out by Christopher
Hood’s utilizationofCT (Hood 1998). Future analysiswill focus
on the argumentation patterns by particular actors and con-
tinued diﬀerentiation according to diﬀerent claims within
worldviews.
CTprovides a unique theory-drivenway to capture debates
amongdiﬀerentworldviews regardingdistinct policy problems
Figure 2
Claim Distribution: United Kingdom
Figure 3
Claim Distribution: United States
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and solutions. Of course, there are many limitations with this
method; nevertheless, CT advances our understanding of the
kind of coalitions that form within the public domain. This
brief analysis ﬁnds support for hypotheses that are central to
CT, namely that all worldviews are present and that these oﬀer
distinct arguments regarding diagnosed problems and advo-
cated solutions. In addition, contestation emerges in response
to a crisis, or surprise when established patterns of domi-
nance are foundwanting.DiﬀerentCT-related arguments have
their own ways of blaming particular other worldviews’ insti-
tutional preferences for the ﬁnancial meltdown of the late
2000s. At least, in terms of argumentation, across the three
countries individuals who blame private actors and therefore
demand more oversight have gained the upper hand.
What does this analysis tell us about regulatory change?
For readers who view the immediate regulatory responses
described in the introduction as a triumph for business and
government interests favoring a return to light touch regula-
tion, this analysis oﬀers the somewhat troubling insight that
signiﬁcant demands for more oversight have not led to signif-
icantly more oversight. For others, the analysis in this article
may support themore reassuring view that heightened public
attention and continued contestation among diﬀerent view-
points means that the future is not one of inevitably “cap-
tured” ﬁnancial regulation. 
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